Doctrine of Completeness

Common law “doctrine of completeness”

• The common law doctrine of completeness provides that “[w]hen one party introduces part of a conversation or document, the opposing party is generally entitled to have the entire conversation or entire instrument placed into evidence.”

Lewis v. State, 754 N.E.2d 603, 606 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied(quoting McElroy v. State, 553 N.E.2d 835, 839 (Ind. 1990))

Indiana Evidence Rule 106

• If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at that time, of any other part—or any other writing or recorded statement—that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time.

Evid. R. 106

Relationship of the common law “doctrine of completeness” to Indiana Evidence Rule 106: In general

• The doctrine of completeness has been incorporated into the Indiana Evidence Rules as Evidence Rule 106.

Norton v. State, 772 N.E.2d 1028, 1033 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied(citing Stanage v. State, 674 N.E.2d 214, 216 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996))

See Walker v. Cuppett, 808 N.E.2d 85, 97 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)(“[Indiana Evidence Rule 106] essentially embodies what was known as the ‘completeness doctrine’ before the passage of the Indiana Evidence Rules in 1994 . . . .”)

See also Hart v. State, 30 N.E.3d 1283, 1289 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied(citing Sanders v. State, 840 N.E.2d 319, 322 (Ind. 2006))(“Indiana Evidence Rule 106 embodies the ‘completeness doctrine.’”)

• Although this Court has observed that the doctrine of completeness has been incorporated into the new Indiana Evidence Rules as Ind[iana] Evidence Rule 106, this is not entirely true. Whereas the doctrine of completeness covered both conversations and documents, Evidence Rule 106 applies only to a writing or recorded statement . . . .

Lewis v. State, 754 N.E.2d 603, 606-07 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied(quotation marks and citations omitted)

• The continued viability of the doctrine as it relates to testimony about conversations—and not the writings or recordings—is supported by post-Rules of Evidence case law.

Lewis v. State, 754 N.E.2d 603, 607 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied

See Barnett v. State, 916 N.E.2d 280, 286 n. 5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied(quoting Lewis v. State, 754 N.E.2d 603, 607 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied)(alteration in the original)(“This court also held that ‘[t]he continued viability of the doctrine as it relates to testimony about conversations—and not the writings or recordings—is supported by post-Rules of Evidence case law.’”)

Relationship of the common law “doctrine of completeness” to Indiana Evidence Rule 106: Interpretation of “a writing or recorded statement”

• [A]ll modes of conveying information, including videotapes, constitute writings or recordings for purposes of Rule 106, even if they are defined by Rule 1001 as “photographs.”

DesJardins v. State, 759 N.E.2d 1036, 1037 (Ind. 2001), reh’g denied

Purpose

• The doctrine's purpose “is to provide context for otherwise isolated comments when fairness requires it.”

Hart v. State, 30 N.E.3d 1283, 1289 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied(quoting Sanders v. State, 840 N.E.2d 319, 323 (Ind. 2006))

Barnett v. State, 916 N.E.2d 280, 286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied(quoting Sanders v. State, 840 N.E.2d 319, 323 (Ind. 2006))

See Akiwumi v. Akiwumi, 23 N.E.3d 734, 739 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)(quoting In re Paternity of B.B., 1 N.E.3d 151, 159 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013))(“‘The purpose of the doctrine of completeness is to allow the introduction of additional material to place incomplete, misleading evidence in its full context.’”)

• [Indiana Evidence Rule 106] “is designed to avoid misleading impressions caused by taking a statement out of its proper context or otherwise conveying a distorted picture by the introduction of only selective parts.”

Atwell v. State, 738 N.E.2d 332, 335 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 876 (2001)(quoting Lieberenz v. State, 717 N.E.2d 1242, 1248 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied)

Barnett v. State, 916 N.E.2d 280, 286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied(citing Lieberenz v. State, 717 N.E.2d 1242, 1248 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied)(“The doctrine is designed to avoid misleading impressions caused by taking a statement out of its proper context or otherwise conveying a distorted picture by the introduction of only selective parts of the document.”)

Walker v. Cuppett, 808 N.E.2d 85, 97 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)(citing Lieberenz v. State, 717 N.E.2d 1242, 1248 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied)(“It is designed to avoid misleading impressions caused by taking a statement out of its proper context or otherwise conveying a distorted picture by the introduction of only selective parts of the document.”)

Invoking the rule: In general

• “The rule may be invoked to admit omitted portions of a statement in order to (1) explain the admitted portion; (2) place the admitted portion in context; (3) avoid misleading the trier of fact; or (4) insure a fair and impartial understanding of the admitted portion.”

Walker v. Cuppett, 808 N.E.2d 85, 97 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)(quoting Lieberenz v. State, 717 N.E.2d 1242, 1248 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied)

Hawkins v. State, 884 N.E.2d 939, 947 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied(quoting Lieberenz v. State, 717 N.E.2d 1242, 1248 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied)

Invoking the rule: Timing

• The State chose to introduce the remainder of [the witness’] statement on redirect, rather than when [the witness’s] alleged threat was raised by defense counsel on cross-examination. However, we note that for reasons of both context and fairness, Evidence Rule 106 allows the contemporaneous admission of “any other part or any other writing or recorded statement.”

Atwell v. State, 738 N.E.2d 332, 335 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 876 (2001)

Limitations on invoking the rule: Fairness

• Evidence Rule 106 is limited by “fairness.” This allows the trial court to use its discretion to determine whether evidence should be admitted as a matter of fairness to the parties and proceedings.

Hawkins v. State, 884 N.E.2d 939, 948 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied

Limitations on invoking the rule: Portions that are neither explanatory of nor relevant to the portions already introduced

• A court need not admit the remainder of the statement, or portions thereof, that are neither explanatory of nor relevant to the portions already introduced.

Hart v. State, 30 N.E.3d 1283, 1289 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied(citing Sanders v. State, 840 N.E.2d 319, 323 (Ind. 2006))

See Hawkins v. State, 884 N.E.2d 939, 947 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied(citing Lieberenz v. State, 717 N.E.2d 1242, 1248 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied)(“The trial court is not required to admit the remainder of the statement, or portions of that statement, if they are neither explanatory of nor relevant to the parts already introduced.”)

Limitations on invoking the rule: Omitted portions are subject to the normal rules of admissibility

• Evid. R. 106 does not specifically require that the omitted portions must be subject to the normal rules of admissibility. However, the committee commentary which accompanies the rule states that, unlike the Uniform Rule of Evidence 106, Indiana's rule requires such admissibility under the doctrine of completeness. Thus, Evid. R. 106 does not change Indiana's common law with regard to the admissibility of the omitted portions sought to be included.

Stanage v. State, 674 N.E.2d 214, 216 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)(emphasis added)

See Norton v. State, 772 N.E.2d 1028, 1033 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied(citing Stanage v. State, 674 N.E.2d 214, 216 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996))(“Evidence Rule 106 does not change the common law with regard to the admissibility of the omitted portions which a party wishes to include.”

• The omitted portions are still subject to the normal rules of admissibility.

Norton v. State, 772 N.E.2d 1028, 1033 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied(citing Evans v. State, 643 N.E.2d 877, 881 (Ind. 1994), reh’g denied)

Stanage v. State, 674 N.E.2d 214, 216 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)(citing Evans v. State, 643 N.E.2d 877, 881 (Ind. 1994), reh’g denied)

• Portions found to be immaterial, irrelevant, or prejudicial must be redacted.

Norton v. State, 772 N.E.2d 1028, 1033 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied(citing Evans v. State, 643 N.E.2d 877, 881 (Ind. 1994), reh’g denied)

See Stanage v. State, 674 N.E.2d 214, 216 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)(citing Evans v. State, 643 N.E.2d 877, 881 (Ind. 1994), reh’g denied)(“Immaterial, irrelevant or prejudicial material must be redacted from the portions of the statement which are admitted.”)

• This includes evidence of prior bad acts committed by the defendant.

Stanage v. State, 674 N.E.2d 214, 216 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)(citing Johnston v. State, 517 N.E.2d 397, 401 (Ind. 1988))

• However, just because statements may be self-serving, they are not automatically excluded under the doctrine of completeness.

Norton v. State, 772 N.E.2d 1028, 1035 (Ind. 2002), trans. denied(citing McElroy v. State, 553 N.E.2d 835 (Ind. 1990))

Relationship to the rule against hearsay: In general

• The doctrine of completeness applies even to self-serving hearsay statements.

Farmer v. State, 908 N.E.2d 1192, 1200 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)(citing McElroy v. State, 553 N.E.2d 835, 839 (Ind. 1990))

See Hawkins v. State, 884 N.E.2d 939, 947 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied(citing McElroy v. State, 553 N.E.2d 835, 839 (Ind. 1990))(“The doctrine even applies to self-serving hearsay statements.”)

See also Sweeney v. State, 704 N.E.2d 86, 110 (Ind. 1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999)(citing McElroy v. State, 553 N.E.2d 835, 839 (Ind. 1990))(“We recently held that the doctrine of completeness applies for even self-serving hearsay statements.”)

• [The defendant] claims the trial court erred in allowing Officer Rhinebarger to testify as to certain incriminating statements that [the defendant] made during police interrogation but [then] denying [the defendant] the right to cross-examine the officer as to what [the defendant] had said [regarding] the manner in which the victim was killed. The trial court sustained the State's objection that such statements made by [the defendnant] were self-serving hearsay and as such should not be admitted. This ruling was erroneous. . . . We conclude that the trial court erred in preventing [the defendant] from cross-examining the officer as to the remainder of the statements.

McElroy v. State, 553 N.E.2d 835, 839-840 (Ind. 1990)

See Farmer v. State, 908 N.E.2d 1192, 1200 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)(“[I]t appears that the trial court should have permitted [the defendant] to elicit from [Detective] Montgomery the self-serving portions of [the defendant’s] statement to the police.”)

• For more information about hearsay, please review Hearsay.

Relationship to the rule against hearsay: Discretion of the trial court

• While the doctrine of completeness does allow for self-serving hearsay, that determination should be and is left to the trial court's discretion.

Hawkins v. State, 884 N.E.2d 939, 948 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied