In General

General rule

• In addition to the required Miranda advisement, a defendant’s self-incriminating statement must also be voluntarily given.

State v. Banks, 2 N.E.3d 71, 80 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied(citing Crain v. State, 736 N.E.2d 1223, 1230 (Ind. 2000))

Cox v. State, 854 N.E.2d 1187, 1193 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)(citing Morales v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1260, 1266 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001))

See Hill v. State, 825 N.E.2d 432, 437 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)(citing Washington v. State, 808 N.E.2d 617, 622 (Ind. 2004))(“For a confession to be admissible, the State must show that it was voluntarily given.”)

Rationale

• “[T]he Fourteenth Amendment forbids the use of involuntary confessions not only because of the probable unreliability of confessions that are obtained in a manner deemed coercive, but also because of the ‘strongly felt attitude of our society that important human values are sacrificed where an agency of the government, in the course of securing a conviction, wrings a confession out of an accused against his will.’”

Bond v. State, 9 N.E.3d 134, 137 (Ind. 2014)(quoting Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 385-86 (1964)(quoting Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206-07 (1960)))(alteration in the original)

Burden of proof

• The State's burden of proving voluntariness is greater under Indiana law than it is under the federal constitution . . . .

D.M. v. State, 949 N.E.2d 327, 334 n. 11 (Ind. 2011)

• Under the United States Constitution, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s confession was voluntary.

Palilonis v. State, 970 N.E.2d 713, 732 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied(citing Clark v. State, 808 N.E.2d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2004))

See Bond v. State, 9 N.E.3d 134, 137 (Ind. 2014)(citing Pruitt v. State, 834 N.E.2d 90, 114 (Ind. 2005), reh’g denied, cert. denied, 548 U.S. 910 (2006))(“When a defendant challenges the voluntariness of his or her confession under the U.S. Constitution, the State must prove the statement was voluntarily given by a preponderance of the evidence.”)

• Under the Indiana Constitution, when the defendant challenges the admissibility of a confession, the State must show voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.

Palilonis v. State, 970 N.E.2d 713, 732 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied(citing Clark v. State, 808 N.E.2d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2004))

See Clark v. State, 808 N.E.2d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2004)(citing Miller v. State, 770 N.E.2d 763, 767 (Ind. 2002))(“The State’s burden under the Indiana Constitution is to show voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.”)

See also Bond v. State, 9 N.E.3d 134, 137 n. 2 (Ind. 2014)(“Though [the defendant] premised his motion on both the U.S. and Indiana Constitutions, he does not articulate a distinct argument for his state claim, which would have required the State to meet the higher hurdle of proving voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.”)

Admissibility versus weight

• The defendant is entitled to a hearing outside the presence of a jury, and the trial court must find voluntariness before admitting it into evidence.

Hogan v. State, 966 N.E.2d 738, 747 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), reh’g denied, trans. denied(citing Morgan v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1067, 1071-72 (Ind. 1996))

See Shields v. State, 699 N.E.2d 636, 640 (Ind. 1998)(citing Haviland v. State, 677 N.E.2d 509, 515 (Ind. 1997), reh’g denied)(“The trial judge must find that a confession was freely and voluntarily given before allowing the jury to hear it.”)

• “[T]he trial court must make a preliminary factual determination of voluntariness when assessing the statement’s admissibility. The jury, however, remains the final arbiter of all factual issues under Article 1, Section 19 of the Indiana Constitution. Even if the court preliminarily determines that the statement is voluntary and admits it for the jury’s consideration, then the defendant is still entitled to dispute the voluntariness of the statement once it is presented to the jury. Although the court has previously determined voluntariness in connection with the statement’s admissibility, the jury may find that the statement was involuntarily given. If the jury makes such a determination, then it should give the statement no weight in deciding the defendant’s guilt or innocence.”

Miller v. State, 770 N.E.2d 763, 772-73 (Ind. 2002)(quoting Morgan v. State, 648 N.E.2d 1164, 1170 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995))(alteration in the original)

Determining voluntariness

• Voluntariness is determined in light of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.

Clark v. State, 808 N.E.2d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2004)(citing Miller v. State, 770 N.E.2d 763, 767 (Ind. 2002))

See Bond v. State, 9 N.E.3d 134, 137 (Ind. 2014)(citing Miller v. State, 770 N.E.2d 763, 767-68 (Ind. 2002))(emphasis added)(“We examine the totality of the circumstances as presented by the record, and are guided by several factors including police coercion; the length, location, and continuity of the interrogation; and the defendant’s maturity, education, physical condition, and mental health.”)

See also Palilonis v. State, 970 N.E.2d 713, 732 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied(citing Washington v. State, 808 N.E.2d 617, 622 (Ind. 2004))(“The voluntariness of a defendant’s confession is determined from the totality of the circumstances.”)

• Relevant factors include the length, location, and continuity of the interrogation, and the maturity, education, physical condition, and mental health of the defendant.

Clark v. State, 808 N.E.2d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2004)(citing Miller v. State, 770 N.E.2d 763, 767 (Ind. 2002))

See Bond v. State, 9 N.E.3d 134, 137 (Ind. 2014)(citing Miller v. State, 770 N.E.2d 763, 767-68 (Ind. 2002))(emphasis added)(“We examine the totality of the circumstances as presented by the record, and are guided by several factors including police coercion; the length, location, and continuity of the interrogation; and the defendant’s maturity, education, physical condition, and mental health.”)

See also Williams v.State, 997 N.E.2d 1154, 1160 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013)(citing Wells v. State, 904 N.E.2d 265, 271 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied)(“In evaluating a claim that a statement was not given voluntarily, the trial court is to consider the totality of the circumstances, including the crucial element of police coercion, the length of the interrogation, its location, its continuity, the defendant's maturity, education, physical condition, and mental health.”)

• A confession is voluntary if it is the product of a rational intellect and not the result of physical abuse, psychological intimidation, or deceptive interrogation tactics that have overcome the defendant’s free will.

Palilonis v. State, 970 N.E.2d 713, 732 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied(citing A.A. v. State, 706 N.E.2d 259, 262 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999))

See Gauvin v. State, 878 N.E.2d 515, 523 (Ind. 2007), trans. denied(citing Crain v. State, 736 N.E.2d 1223, 1231 (Ind. 2000))(“A statement is voluntary if, in light of the totality of the circumstances, the confession is the product of a rational intellect and not the result of physical abuse, psychological intimidation, or deceptive interrogation tactics that have overcome the defendant’s free will.”)

• To determine that a confession was given voluntarily, the court must conclude that inducement, threats, violence, or other improper influences did not overcome the defendant’s free will.

Clark v. State, 808 N.E.2d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2004)(citing Ellis v. State, 707 N.E.2d 797, 801 (Ind. 1999))

Hill v. State, 825 N.E.2d 432, 437 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)(citing Clark v. State, 808 N.E.2d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2004))(“To be voluntary, we must conclude that inducement, threats, violence, or other improper influences did not overcome the defendant's free will.”)

See Bond v. State, 9 N.E.3d 134, 137 (Ind. 2014)(citing Ringo v. State, 736 N.E.2d 1209, 1212-13 (Ind. 2000))(“‘The critical inquiry is whether the defendant’s statements were induced by violence, threats, promises or other improper influence.’”)

• Ultimately, a court looks at the effect of the interrogation on the defendant’s “will to resist.”

See Shields v. State, 699 N.E.2d 636, 640 (Ind. 1998)(quoting Haviland v. State, 677 N.E.2d 509, 515 (Ind. 1997), reh’g denied)

Factors to be considered when determining voluntariness: Maturity

• The mere fact that [the defendant] was only eighteen when he admitted his complicity did not render his confession involuntary. Indeed, [the defendant] testified that he comprehended his rights prior to confessing. Twice he was advised of those rights yet he elected to cooperate with the police. Furthermore, [the defendant] had several previous encounters with law enforcement officers regarding unrelated crimes. In no way has he demonstrated that his age precluded a finding of voluntariness.

Middleton v. State, 391 N.E.2d 657, 660 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979)(emphasis added)

• [The defendant] was not an individual of such ‘tender years’ that an intelligent, knowing and voluntary waiver of rights could not be made in the absence of his parents.

Banks v. State, 351 N.E.2d 4, 9 (Ind. 1976), reh’g denied, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1077 (1977)

Factors to be considered when determining voluntariness: Education

• A defendant’s limited education standing alone does not render a confession involuntary.

Jackson v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1146, 1154 (Ind. 2000)(citing Brown v. State, 698 N.E.2d 1132, 1142 (Ind. 1998), reh’g denied, cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1056 (1999))

See, e.g., Glenn v. State, 493 N.E.2d 463, 465 (Ind. 1986)(“It is true [the defendant] was relatively uneducated and virtually illiterate; however, his rights were carefully explained to him after which he stated he understood the explanation. There is no indication in the record that the police officers took advantage of [the defendant’s] lack of education in taking his statement.”)

Factors to be considered when determining voluntariness: Physical condition

• It is true that intoxication and lack of sleep may be factors in determining voluntariness. Ringo v. State, 736 N.E.2d 1209, 1213 (Ind. 2000). But these factors are not sufficient of themselves. Instead they are included in the totality of the circumstances that a trial court considers in ruling on whether to admit a statement. Brewer v. State, 646 N.E.2d 1382, 1385 (Ind. 1995).

Treadway v. State, 924 N.E.2d 621, 635 (Ind. 2010)(emphasis added)

See Shields v. State, 699 N.E.2d 636, 640 (Ind. 1998)(emphasis added)(“[A]lthough some evidence suggests that the defendant may have been upset or tired, he points to no evidence that tends to show that the confession was obtained through any improper or coercive influence of the police.”)

See also Scalissi v. State, 759 N.E.2d 618, 621 (Ind. 2001)(citing Ringo v. State, 736 N.E.2d 1209, 1213 (Ind. 2000))(emphasis added)(“Factors such as intoxication and lack of sleep may be factors in determining voluntariness.”)

• The defendant’s confession was not rendered involuntary due to a one-and-a-half by two inch abrasion on his forehead that he received during events related to his apprehension and shortly before his interview at the police station.

See Maxwell v. State, 839 N.E.2d 1285, 1289-91 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied(quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 401 (1978))(“The record leaves us without any doubt that Maxwell’s abrasion on his forehead did not render him ‘a seriously and painfully wounded man on the edge of consciousness.’ … The court did not err when it found Maxwell’s confessions were voluntary, and therefore, it did not abuse its discretion when it admitted those confessions into evidence.”)

• [The defendant] offers no authority for the proposition that the force necessary to control an intractable suspect should render any subsequent confession involuntary. There is no evidence in the record that police exceeded the level of force necessary to take [the defendant] into custody and, therefore, there was nothing from which counsel could have argued that the confession was coerced.

Barany v. State, 658 N.E.2d 60, 66 (Ind. 1995)

Factors to be considered when determining voluntariness: Mental health

• [A] defendant’s limited intelligence or mental health alone does not render a confession involuntary.

Brown v. State, 698 N.E.2d 1132, 1142 (Ind. 1998), reh’g denied

See Rhodes v. State, 698 N.E.2d 304, 308 (Ind. 1998)(citing Smith v. State, 689 N.E.2d 1238, 1247-48 & n. 12 (Ind. 1997))(“A defendant’s mental condition alone does not render a confession involuntary.”)

See also Faris v. State, 901 N.E.2d 1123, 1127 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied(quoting Smith v. State, 689 N.E.2d 1238, 1248 (Ind. 1997))( “‘Stated another way, a defendant’s mental state is not enough to render a confession inadmissible in the absence of coercive police activity.’”)

See also State v. Banks, 2 N.E.3d 71, 81 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied(quoting Pruitt v. State, 834 N.E.2d 90, 115 (Ind. 2005), reh’g denied, cert. denied, 548 U.S. 910 (2006))(emphasis added)(“‘The mere fact a statement is made by the defendant while under the influence of drugs, or that the defendant is mentally ill, does not render it inadmissible per se.’”)

• [L]ow mental capacity of a defendant alone is not a cause for excluding the evidence. Rather, it is but one factor in the totality of the circumstances to consider in determining whether the confession was freely and knowingly given.

Wessling v. State, 798 N.E.2d 929, 936 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)(citing Finchum v. State, 463 N.E.2d 304, 309 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984))

See A.A. v. State, 706 N.E.2d 259, 262 n. 7 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)(citing Pettiford v. State, 619 N.E.2d 925, 928 (Ind. 1993))(“A person’s mental condition is relevant, although not controlling, to the determination of the voluntariness of a confession.”)

See also State v. Banks, 2 N.E.3d 71, 81 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied(quoting Pruitt v. State, 834 N.E.2d 90, 115 (Ind. 2005), reh’g denied, cert. denied, 548 U.S. 910 (2006))(emphasis added)(“‘Intoxication, drug use and mental illness are only factors to be considered by the trier of fact in determining whether a statement was voluntary.’”)

• The degree of impairment of the defendant’s mental faculties at the time of the waiver and confession is of critical importance in determining whether a statement was given voluntarily.

Nichols v. State, 542 N.E.2d 572, 574 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989)(citing Brown v. State, 485 N.E.2d 108, 113 (Ind. 1985))

Factors to be considered when determining voluntariness: Intoxication and drug use

• [A] confession may be given knowingly and voluntarily, notwithstanding voluntary intoxication.

Bean v. State, 913 N.E.2d 243, 249 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied(citing Ellis v. State, 707 N.E.2d 797, 802 (Ind. 1999))

• Our courts have consistently held that statements are not inadmissible per se when a suspect is intoxicated; they are only inadmissible because of intoxication when the suspect is so intoxicated that he is unaware of what he is saying or the intoxication has produced a state of mania in the suspect.

Palilonis v. State, 970 N.E.2d 713, 732 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied

See Wilkes v. State, 917 N.E.2d 675, 680 (Ind. 2009), reh’g denied, cert. denied, 562 U.S. 981 (2010)(citing Pruitt v. State, 834 N.E.2d 90, 115 (Ind. 2005), reh’g denied, cert. denied, 548 U.S. 910 (2006))(“Statements are inadmissible due to intoxication only when an accused is intoxicated to the point that he is unaware of what he is saying.”)

See also Luckhart v. State, 736 N.E.2d 227, 231 (Ind. 2000)(citing Ellis v. State, 707 N.E.2d 797, 802 (Ind. 1999))(“We will deem a defendant’s confession incompetent only when she is so intoxicated that it renders her not conscious of what she is doing or produces a state of mania.”)

See also Pruitt v. State, 834 N.E.2d 90, 115 (Ind. 2005), reh’g denied, cert. denied, 548 U.S. 910 (2006)(quoting Whitehead v. State, 511 N.E.2d 284, 293 (Ind. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1031 (1988), overruled on other grounds by Wheldon v. State, 765 N.E.2d 1276, 1279 (Ind. 2002))(“When a defendant claims he was under the influence of drugs at the time he made a statement, ‘the degree of his mental impairment is of critical importance.’”)

• Intoxication of a lesser degree goes only to the weight to be given to the statement, not to its admissibility.

Palilonis v. State, 970 N.E.2d 713, 732 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied(citing Wilkes v. State, 917 N.E.2d 675, 680 (Ind. 2009), reh’g denied, cert. denied, 562 U.S. 981 (2010))

See Luckhart v. State, 736 N.E.2d 227, 231 (Ind. 2000)(citing Ellis v. State, 707 N.E.2d 797, 802 (Ind. 1999))(“Intoxication to a lesser degree only goes to the weight to be given to the confession, not its admissibility.”)

• Intoxication and drug use are only factors to be considered by the trier of fact in determining whether a statement was voluntary.

Wells v. State, 904 N.E.2d 265, 272 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied(citing Pruitt v. State, 834 N.E.2d 90, 115 (Ind. 2005), reh’g denied, cert. denied, 548 U.S. 910 (2006))

Factors to be considered when determining voluntariness: Experience with the legal system

• The [defendant] asserts that he had no criminal record and had never been arrested, therefore he lacked experience in criminal matters. While lack of criminal experience is a factor, it is not complete in itself. The real question is whether, considering all factors, was he in possession of information at the time to render his confession knowingly and voluntarily.

Smith v. State, 249 N.E.2d 493, 497 (Ind. 1969)(citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966), reh’g denied)

See, e.g., Williams v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1154, 1160 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013)(“[The defendant] claims that the police coerced him into giving a statement and claims that he did not really understand what it meant to have a lawyer. He also claims that the police misled him into believing that his statements would not be used against him and that the police were there simply to help him. We disagree.”)

Interpretations of “coercion”

• [S]tandard police interrogation does not equate to coercion.

Davies v. State, 730 N.E.2d 726, 733 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), reh’g denied, trans. denied, cert. denied, 532 U.S. 945 (2001)

• It is true that apparently [the defendant] was in a straight-backed chair for three hours, but there is no authority for the proposition that an interrogation of this length is inherently coercive.

Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 386 (2010), reh’g denied

• [The defendant] claims that his confession was involuntary because it was the product of intrusive and coercive actions by the police. . . . Specifically, [the defendant] claims . . . police had their guns drawn when they arrested him . . . . [W]e have held that the presence of guns at the scene of an arrest is not evidence of coercion, but merely cautious police procedure.

Turner v. State, 738 N.E.2d 660, 662 (Ind. 2000)(citation omitted)

See Bluitt v. State, 381 N.E.2d 458, 464 (Ind. 1978)(“The presence of guns at the scene of the arrest does not constitute evidence of coercion.”)

• “[T]he Fifth Amendment privilege is not concerned ‘with moral and psychological pressures to confess emanating from sources other than official coercion.’”

Carr v. State, 934 N.E.2d 1096, 1105 (Ind. 2010), reh’g denied(quoting Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 387 (2010), reh’g denied)(quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 (1986)))(alteration in the original)

Improper influences

• For more information about different types of improper influences, please review:

Effect of Deceit

Effect of Promises

Effect of Threats