Flight

In general

• Flight may be considered as circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt.

Jones v. State, 485 N.E.2d 627, 628 (Ind. 1985)(citing Frith v. State, 325 N.E.2d 186, 189(Ind. 1975))

See Clark v. State, 6 N.E.3d 992, 999 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)(quoting Brown v. State, 563 N.E.2d 103, 107 (Ind. 1990))(“‘Evidence of flight may be considered as circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt.’”)

See also Tuggle v. State, 9 N.E.3d 726, 736 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied(citing State v. Torphy, 28 N.E.2d 70, 72 (Ind. 1940))(“Flight shows consciousness of guilt.”)

See also Jenkins v. State, 909 N.E.2d 1080, 1083 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied(“[The defendant’s] flight itself leads to a reasonable inference of guilt.”)

• “Absenting oneself from the community in which a crime has been committed may imply guilty knowledge even though it does not evince the planning of an experienced criminal.”

Anderson v. State, 774 N.E.2d 906, 910 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)(quoting Bruce v. State, 375 N.E.2d 1042, 1078 (Ind. 1978), reh’g denied, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 988 (1978))

Rebutting the inference of guilt

• When a defendant’s flight from the community shortly after a crime is placed in issue, he is entitled to introduce evidence . . . which serve[s] to explain his flight and rebut the inference raised therefrom.

Chittenden v. State, 436 N.E.2d 86, 88 (Ind. 1982)(summarizing a holding of Crisp v. State, 394 N.E.2d 115 (Ind. 1979))

See Caveney v. State, 4 N.E.2d 137, 139 (Ind. 1936)(“Since the state had been permitted to introduce evidence showing the flight of the [defendant], it was entirely proper for him to introduce in evidence any facts to show that the flight was consistent with his innocence.”)

Insufficiency of flight alone

• We have previously held that flight alone will not support a conviction and that this is particularly true when there is an explanation of a flight which is consistent with the hypothesis of innocence.

Banks v. State, 276 N.E.2d 155, 159 (Ind. 1971), reh’g denied

Cf. Keaton v. State, 380 N.E.2d 587, 588 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978)(citing Henderson v. State, 364 N.E.2d 175, 179 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977), reh’g denied)(“While evidence of flight Alone is not a reliable indicium of guilt, when there is other, direct, convincing evidence of guilt, admission of evidence of flight is not necessarily error.”)

• “[I]t is a matter of common knowledge that men who are entirely innocent do sometimes fly from the scene of a crime through fear of being apprehended as the guilty parties, or from an unwillingness to appear as witnesses. Nor is it true as an accepted axiom of criminal law that ‘the wicked flee when no man pursueth; but the righteous are bold as a lion.’ Innocent men sometimes hesitate to confront a jury,-not necessarily because they fear that the jury will not protect them, but because they do not wish their names to appear in connection with criminal acts, are humiliated at being obliged to incur the popular odium of an arrest and trial, or because they do not wish to be put to the annoyance or expense of defending themselves.”

Dill v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1230, 1233 (Ind. 2001)(quoting Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499, 511 (1896))

E.g., Bruce v. State, 375 N.E.2d 1042, 1078 (Ind. 1978), reh’g denied, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 988 (1978)(“The evidence of [the defendant’s] exodus was capable of interpretation as either a ‘flight in avoidance’ or an ‘innocent exit.’”)

Admissibility of evidence of flight and related conduct

• Flight and related conduct may be considered by a jury in determining a defendant’s guilt.

Dill v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (Ind. 2001)(citing Johnson v. State, 284 N.E.2d 517, 519 (Ind. 1972), reh’g granted)

Clark v. State, 6 N.E.3d 992, 999 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)(quoting Dill v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (Ind. 2001))

See Hayes v. State, 876 N.E.2d 373, 376 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied(“Flight may be considered by the fact-finder in determining a defendant's guilt.”)

E.g., Bennett v. State, 883 N.E.2d 888, 892 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied(“The evidence of [the defendant’s] flight and assumption of false identity are indicative of a guilty mind and were properly before the jury.”)

• This Court has repeatedly held that flight of an accused or other related conduct calculated to hide a crime or escape from the scene of a crime is admissible as evidence of guilt. It is for the trier of fact to determine what weight and value should be given to such evidence.

Turner v. State, 265 N.E.2d 11, 12 (Ind. 1970), reh’g denied(citing Reno v. State, 228 N.E.2d 14, 15-16 (Ind. 1967))

See Engle v. State, 467 N.E.2d 712, 715 (Ind. 1984)(citing James v. State, 354 N.E.2d 236, 240-41 (Ind. 1976))(“Evidence of flight from the scene of the crime is admissible.”)

See also Banks v. State, 276 N.E.2d 155, 159 (Ind. 1971), reh’g denied(citing Reno v. State, 228 N.E.2d 14, 15-16 (Ind. 1967))(“[I]t is a matter, generally, for the trier of the facts to determine what weight and value should be given to such evidence.”)

• Reasons for escape or flight relate to the weight to be given evidence rather than the admissibility of evidence.

Keaton v. State, 380 N.E.2d 587, 588 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978)(citing Harms v. State, 295 N.E.2d 156, 159 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973), reh’g denied)

See Henderson v. State, 364 N.E.2d 175, 179 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977), reh’g denied(citing Harms v. State, 295 N.E.2d 156, 159 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973), reh’g denied)(“The reasons for escape or flight relate to the weight to be given to the evidence, not its admissibility.”)

• It is true that evidence of flight may be considered with regard to the defendant’s guilt or innocence. . . . However, in analyzing evidence of flight, this court must look at the totality of the circumstances including the method of flight employed and how it relates to the crime.

Cantrell v. State, 673 N.E.2d 816, 819 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied

See Banks v. State, 276 N.E.2d 155, 159 (Ind. 1971), reh’g denied(citing 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law s 907, p. 559)(“[T]he flight of an accused is a circumstance to be considered against him only in connection with other evidence, its probative effect, as evidence of guilt, depending upon the conditions[,] and the motive which prompted it.”)

Interpretations of “flight”

• The supreme court, in Dill, reiterated the holding that flight and related conduct may be considered by a jury in determining a defendant’s guilt. This court does not read Dill as holding that flight must occur shortly after the commission of a crime or to avoid prosecution in order to be admissible.

Bennett v. State, 883 N.E.2d 888, 891 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied(citing Dill v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (Ind. 2001))(emphasis added)

But see Cantrell v. State, 673 N.E.2d 816, 818 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied(“It appears to this court that the giving of a false name as evidence of flight is only of significant probative value when the act actually assists the defendant in avoiding arrest, i.e., it constitutes avoidance of arrest.”)

• [A] sudden trip can be characterized as flight and, although standing alone does not raise a presumption of guilt, it is competent to show consciousness of guilt.

Weinberger v. Boyer, 956 N.E.2d 1095, 1107 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied(citing Gash v. Kohm, 476 N.E.2d 910, 915 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985), reh’g denied, trans. denied)(emphasis added)

• The giving of a false name is a form of flight and thus evidence of consciousness of guilt.

Bennett v. State, 883 N.E.2d 888, 891 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied(emphasis added)

Serano v. State, 555 N.E.2d 487, 494 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), trans. denied(citing Rogers v. State, 315 N.E.2d 707, 712 (Ind. 1974))

See Cantrell v. State, 673 N.E.2d 816, 819 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied(“It is also true that the giving of a false name may be considered a form of flight.”)

• For more information about using a false name as circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt, please review Using a False Name.

Escape

• Evidence of escape or attempted escape and avoidance of arrest or capture is always competent evidence of the consciousness of guilt and a matter for the consideration of the jury.

Meredith v. State, 214 N.E.2d 385, 386 (Ind. 1966)

See Manley v. State, 410 N.E.2d 1338, 1340 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)(citing Lofton v. State, 378 N.E.2d 834, 838 (Ind. 1978))(“Evidence of attempted escape is always competent evidence of consciousness of guilt.”)

See also Lee v. State, 439 N.E.2d 603, 604 (Ind. 1982)(citing Lofton v. State, 378 N.E.2d 834, 838 (Ind. 1978))(“It is . . . well settled that evidence of an attempted escape is relevant to show consciousness of guilt.”)

See also Gregory v. State, 540 N.E.2d 585, 591-92 (Ind. 1989)(citing Porter v. State, 391 N.E.2d 801, 812 (Ind. 1979), reh’g denied)(“Flight or escape from custody may be admissible and relevant as circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt.”)

• The magnitude and extremes to which a defendant goes in attempting to escape are certainly competent for the jury's consideration.

Meredith v. State, 214 N.E.2d 385, 387 (Ind. 1966)

• Reasons for escape or flight relate to the weight to be given evidence rather than the admissibility of evidence.

Keaton v. State, 380 N.E.2d 587, 588 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978)(citing Harms v. State, 295 N.E.2d 156, 159 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973), reh’g denied)

• We . . . reject Defendant's claim that such attempted escape was too remote, in point of time, to support an inference of consciousness of guilt, as to the crime charged. Trial courts have wide discretion regarding the exclusion of evidence for remoteness. That substantial time had passed goes to the weight of the evidence but does not render it inadmissible.

Allen v. State, 431 N.E.2d 478, 485 (Ind. 1982)(citations omitted)