• Wholly volunteered and unsolicited statements are not inadmissible because Miranda warnings were not given.
State v. Bowen, 491 N.E.2d 1022, 1025 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986)(citing Lowery v. State, 478 N.E.2d 1214, 1222 (Ind. 1985), reh’g denied, cert. denied, 475 U.S.1098 (1986))
See Munn v. State, 505 N.E.2d 782, 787 (Ind. 1987)(“The inculpatory statements were voluntary and unsolicited. They were therefore admissible into evidence.”)
Scope of the general rule
• Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence. The fundamental import of the privilege while an individual is in custody is not whether he is allowed to talk to the police without the benefit of warnings and counsel, but whether he can be interrogated. There is no requirement that police stop a person who enters a police station and states that he wishes to confess to a crime, or a person who calls the police to offer a confession or any other statement he desires to make. Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966), reh’g denied(emphasis added)(footnote omitted)
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 299-300 (1980)(quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966), reh’g denied)(alterations in the original)(emphasis added)
See White v. State, 495 N.E.2d 725, 728 (Ind. 1986)(citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 299-300 (1980))(“Any statement made freely, voluntarily, and without any compelling influence is admissible evidence.”)
See also Carter v. State, 634 N.E.2d 830, 833-34 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)(citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966), reh’g denied)(“We note for clarity that volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by Miranda.”)
• The concept of custodial interrogation does not operate to extend the Miranda safeguards to spontaneous voluntary statements, i.e. statements which are either not made in response to questions posed by law enforcement officers while the defendant is in custody, or statements which are made before the officers are given an opportunity to administer the Miranda warnings.
Johnson v. State, 380 N.E.2d 1236, 1240 (Ind. 1978)(citations omitted)
See Tacy v. State, 452 N.E.2d 977, 982 (Ind. 1983), reh’g denied(citing Smith v. State, 419 N.E.2d 743, 747 (Ind. 1981))(“A wholly volunteered and unsolicited statement by the accused is not the product of a custodial interrogation such that any advisement of rights need be given.”)
Made by a person who is in custody
• Where . . . a defendant is in custody but makes a wholly volunteered and unsolicited statement, Miranda is not applicable.
Hicks v. State, 609 N.E.2d 1165, 1166 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993)(citing State v. Bowen, 491 N.E.2d 1022, 1024 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986))
See New v. State, 259 N.E.2d 696, 700 (Ind. 1970)(“The statements made to Sgt. Petro while [the defendant] was admittedly in custody, were not made in response to any interrogation. These statements were freely, voluntarily and spontaneously given by the [defendant]. Such statements are admissible in evidence.”)
Made by a person who is not in custody
• Unsolicited statements made by a suspect who is not undergoing custodial interrogation are not subject to the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona.
Gilreath v. State, 577 N.E.2d 997, 1003 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), trans. denied
• [I]t is clear that Miranda is not violated if the suspect initiates conversation with a police officer and the officer does nothing more than provide a direct answer to a suspect's unsolicited inquiry.
Furnish v. State, 779 N.E.2d 576, 580 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied