State of Mind

Text of the rule

• The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness:

(3) Then-Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition. A statement of the declarant’s then-existing state of mind (such as motive, design, intent, or plan) or emotional, sensory, or physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of the declarant’s will.

Evid. R. 803(3)

• For information about using hearsay to show a declarant’s then-existing physical condition, please review Physical Condition.

Interpretations of the text: In general

• Evidence Rule 803(3) allows for admission of hearsay when the statement is offered to show a declarant's then-existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition.

Pierce v. State, 705 N.E.2d 173, 175-76 (Ind. 1998)

See Ford v. State, 704 N.E.2d 457, 459 (Ind. 1998), reh’g denied(“Evidence Rule 803(3) permits use of otherwise inadmissible hearsay when the statement is offered to show a declarant's then-existing state of mind.”)

See also Simmons v. State, 746 N.E.2d 81, 89 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), reh’g denied, trans. denied(“Our Supreme Court has recognized that a statement of a declarant's then existing state of mind is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule.”)

• We have noted three situations where such testimony is admissible: (1) to show the intent of the victim to act in a particular way, (2) when the defendant puts the victim's state of mind in issue, and (3) sometimes to explain physical injuries suffered by the victim.

Hatcher v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1155, 1161 (Ind. 2000)(citing Taylor v. State, 659 N.E.2d 535, 543 (Ind. 1995))

See Pierce v. State, 705 N.E.2d 173, 176 (Ind. 1998)(“Such instances include where the statements are offered: (1) to show the intent of the victim to act in a particular way, (2) to controvert a defendant's evidence when the defendant puts the victim's state of mind at issue, and sometimes (3) to explain a victim's physical injuries.”)

See also Stewart v. State, 945 N.E.2d 1277, 1286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied(citing Camm v. State, 908 N.E.2d 215, 226 (Ind. 2009), reh’g denied)(“Such statements may be admissible under this exception when the statements are offered to show the intent of the declarant to act in a particular way.”)

See also Taylor v. State, 659 N.E.2d 535, 543 (Ind. 1995)(“Such evidence is also admissible where the defendant puts the victim's state of mind in issue.”)

• For information about using hearsay to explain physical injuries suffered by the victim, please review Physical Condition.

• We decline the State's invitation to extend this list to include the admissibility of a victim's state of mind to show the nature of the relationship between the victim and the defendant.

Hatcher v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1155, 1161 (Ind. 2000)

Interpretations of the text: Interpretations of “then-existing”

• The state-of-mind exception does not include statements of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered.

McGrew v. State, 673 N.E.2d 787, 794 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), reh’g denied, aff’d in relevant part, 682 N.E.2d 1289 (Ind. 1997)(citing Evid. R. 803(3))

• The rule requires that the statement relate to the declarant's then-existing state of mind. The defendant's statement hours after the crime was not indicative of his then-existing state of mind, but referred to his intention at the time of the crime. This is an inadmissible statement of memory offered after the fact to prove the fact remembered, i.e., that the defendant did not intend to kill the victim.

Jackson v. State, 697 N.E.2d 53, 54-55 (Ind. 1998)

• The State also claims that the statements fit into an exception from the general rule excluding hearsay evidence because they are statements of [the victim’s] then existing state of mind. We think that her statements of fear do not fit squarely into that exception, because most of the statements were made hours or days after the beating incidents, and as such were not contemporaneous with [the victim’s] mental emotions.

Spencer v. State, 703 N.E.2d 1053, 156 n. 3 (Ind. 1999)(citations omitted)

Intent of the declarant to act in a particular way: In general

• The exception applies to statements of any person to show his or her intent to act in a particular way and is not limited only to statements by victims of crimes.

Stewart v. State, 945 N.E.2d 1277, 1286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied(citing Pelley v. State, 901 N.E.2d 494, 504 n. 5 (Ind. 2009), reh’g denied)

• [S]uch declarations may be admitted not only as proof of the declarant's then-existing state of mind, but also as circumstantial evidence of the declarant's future conduct.

Camm v. State, 908 N.E.2d 215, 226 (Ind. 2009), reh’g denied

Stewart v. State, 945 N.E.2d 1277, 1286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied(citing Camm v. State, 908 N.E.2d 215, 226 (Ind. 2009), reh’g denied)

• A jury may infer from the declarant's past state of mind that the declarant held the same mental state at a future time and acted on it.

Camm v. State, 908 N.E.2d 215, 226 (Ind. 2009), reh’g denied

• [W]hile state-of-mind declarations are admissible under Rule 803(3) when offered to prove or explain acts or conduct of the declarant, they are not admissible when offered to prove a third party's conduct.

Camm v. State, 908 N.E.2d 215, 228 (Ind. 2009), reh’g denied

See Stewart v. State, 945 N.E.2d 1277, 1286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied(citing Camm v. State, 908 N.E.2d 215, 226-27 (Ind. 2009), reh’g denied)(“[T]he statement must go to the declarant's intent to act and cannot be a statement by the declarant about some other person's intent to act in the future.”)

Intent of the declarant to act in a particular way: Rationale

• Courts permit this sub-category of evidence because it lacks many of the dangers traditionally associated with hearsay: a jury's connecting a declarant's expressed mental state to their actions requires inferring only that one generally does what they intend, with no need to appraise memory, perception, or testimonial qualities.

Camm v. State, 908 N.E.2d 215, 226 (Ind. 2009), reh’g denied

When the defendant puts the victim's state of mind at issue: Examples

• In this case, defendant put the victim's state of mind at issue by portraying her as a happily married wife who peacefully spent her time writing love notes and poems for her husband.

Angleton v. State, 686 N.E.2d 803, 809 (Ind. 1997), reh’g denied

• The victim’s statement to her friend that she was afraid the defendant, her husband, would kill her if she left him again was admissible, as evidence of victim's then-existing state of mind, to controvert evidence the defendant presented to show that the victim acted aggressively towards him and provoked his actions.

See Ford v. State, 704 N.E.2d 457, 459-60 (Ind. 1998), reh’g denied

When the defendant puts the victim's state of mind at issue: Bootstrapping evidence into admission

• The State cannot bootstrap this evidence into admissibility by putting it in, forcing a denial, and then claiming it was put in issue by the defendant.

Willey v. State, 712 N.E.2d 434, 444 (Ind. 1999)

E.g., Bassett v. State, 795 N.E.2d 1050, 1052 (Ind. 2003)(“The victim's statements to others that the defendant had threatened her were first revealed to the jury during the State's opening statement. The statements were then presented in evidence during the State's case in chief. The defendant later took the stand and denied ever having a romantic or sexual relationship with the victim. The victim's statements reflected her then-existing state of mind, i.e. her fear of the defendant, but the defendant was not the party who put his relationship with the victim into issue. As evidence of the victim's relationship with the defendant, an issue not raised by the defense, the statements were thus not admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule.”)

• [The defendant] is therefore prohibited from “bootstrapping” this evidence into admission by offering it and then claiming that the State put it in issue.

Bryant v. State, 802 N.E.2d 486, 497 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)

Relevancy

• Of course, the state of mind declaration must be relevant to some issue in the case.

Ford v. State, 704 N.E.2d 457, 460 (Ind. 1998), reh’g denied

See Simmons v. State, 760 N.E.2d 1154, 1160 (Ind. 2002)(citing Evid. R. 402)(“In addition to the requirement that hearsay fall under an exception to be admissible, our Rules of Evidence also mandate that only relevant evidence is admissible.”)

See also Willey v. State, 712 N.E.2d 434, 444 (Ind. 1999)(citing Evid. R. 402)(“In addition to the requirement that hearsay fall under an exception to be admissible, the Rules of Evidence also mandate that only relevant evidence is admissible.”)

• This Court recently observed that a “victim's state of mind is relevant where it has been put in issue by the defendant.”

Willey v. State, 712 N.E.2d 434, 444 (Ind. 1999)(quoting Angleton v. State, 686 N.E.2d 803, 809 (Ind. 1997), reh’g denied)

Simmons v. State, 760 N.E.2d 1154, 1160 (Ind. 2002)(quoting Angleton v. State, 686 N.E.2d 803, 809 (Ind. 1997), reh’g denied)(“The Indiana Supreme Court has observed that a ‘victim's state of mind is relevant where it has been put in issue by the defendant.’”)

See Bassett v. State, 795 N.E.2d 1050, 1051-52 (Ind. 2003)(discussing Willey v. State, 712 N.E.2d 434, 444 (Ind. 1999))(“We observed that evidence under the Rule 803(3) state of mind exception must be relevant to the issues in the case, Evid. R. 402, and that a victim's state of mind may be relevant where it has been put in issue by the defendant.”)

• For more information about relevancy, please review Relevancy.

State of mind declarations not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted

• [W]hen the statement is not a direct assertion of the declarant's then existing state of mind but circumstantial evidence of it, it is being offered not to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but for some other purpose; thus, the statement by definition is not hearsay.

Simmons v. State, 746 N.E.2d 81, 89 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), reh’g denied, trans. denied

See also Angleton v. State, 686 N.E.2d 803, 809 (Ind. 1997), reh’g denied(citing Dunaway v. State, 440 N.E.2d 682, 686 (Ind. 1982))(“If a statement, the substantive content of which does not directly assert the declarant's state of mind, is admitted to show only the declarant's state of mind, it is not hearsay.”)

See also Vehorn v. State, 717 N.E.2d 869, 873-74 (Ind. 1999)(citing Angleton v. State, 686 N.E.2d 803, 809 (Ind. 1997), reh’g denied)(“If statements are admitted to show the declarant's state of mind, and not to prove the substantive content of those statements, they do not run afoul of the hearsay rule because, by definition, those statements are not ‘hearsay’ pursuant to Evidence Rule 802.”)

• Such a statement is admissible, and an admonishment to the jury not to use the statement for its truth is appropriate.

Angleton v. State, 686 N.E.2d 803, 809 (Ind. 1997), reh’g denied(citations omitted)

• For more information about statements not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, please review Statements Not Offered for the Truth of the Matter Asserted.